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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY  
AFFAIRS  
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on the Force Posture Study  
(PRM/NSC-10) (C)

I attach the final draft of a Memorandum for the President on the PRM-10 Force Posture Study which will provide background for a discussion I hope to have with the President next week.

In order to assure that the President has an opportunity to study this memorandum before our meeting, I wish to forward it to him as soon as possible. I therefore request your agreement by noon, Wednesday, 12 May.

Enclosure

*Harold Brown*

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Meeting on the Force Posture Study (PRM/NSC-10) (C)

(S) This memorandum is for your information and provides a brief description of the work to date in the force posture part of PRM/NSC-10. The study is scheduled for discussion with you on \_\_\_\_\_.

(S) The basic US national security objective is to preserve the US as a free nation, maintaining the nation's economic, institutional and social well-being. Fundamentally, the US must be able to deter war or, should it occur, terminate it favorably in terms of that objective. This requires deterring, in conjunction with our NATO Allies, a Warsaw Pact attack or coercion in Europe; maintaining a balance of power in Asia among the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union; in other areas, supporting the integrity of allies, ensuring freedom of movement in international seas and air space, and promoting access to raw materials and markets. Agreement on these general objectives, however, does not translate directly into agreement as to what US military strategy would best advance those objectives or what mix of forces best supports such a strategy.

(S) The purpose of the final PRM-10 report will be to highlight critical issues and to define alternative military strategies and force postures to assist you in the formulation of policies to guide the Department of Defense in developing its future programs and establishing a flexible peacetime posture.

(S) Shaping an overall military strategy requires judgments about how the world is evolving politically, economically and technologically. The other part of PRM-10 (Net Assessment) is addressing this broad setting: the sources, nature and severity of threats; the political and economic health of the West; the degree and forms of competition with the Soviet Union; and the extent of instability in the Third World.

(C) Our approach to formulating alternative integrated military strategies (AIMS) is through substrategy building blocks that are interest-oriented, focusing on what the US wants to achieve as well as the threats to that achievement. Five analytical areas were defined:

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TAB A: NATO-Warsaw Pact Conflict in Europe  
TAB B: Non-European Operations During a NATO-WP War in Europe  
TAB C: East Asia  
TAB D: Peacekeeping Activities and Potential Local Wars  
TAB E: US-USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict

(C) Military substrategies were chosen to provide a range of alternatives. Each needs to be considered as an individual, potential element in the design of overall US military strategies. The areas were chosen as sufficiently distinguishable to be analytically useful, though obviously they are interdependent. Resultant overlap will be eliminated as integrated strategies and force postures are evolved. For example:

Nuclear Forces: A major nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is addressed in the context of US-USSR Homelands Nuclear Conflict (TAB E), but strategic and theater nuclear forces are also addressed in the context of linkage to NATO (TAB A), political perceptions in China and Japan (TAB C), and nuclear proliferation in the Third World (TABS C and D).

Forces in Peacetime: Requirements for military forces are derived from wartime functions, i.e., what forces are needed to accomplish specific tasks in battle. However, military forces also serve a variety of peacetime functions, such as reassurance of allies and demonstrations of commitment. It is unlikely that forces need to be procured for those purposes that would not serve important wartime purposes. However, the peacetime functions can require some forces being deployed in different postures from those dictated by a pure warfighting perspective. Thus, the peacetime functions of military force are analyzed not only in peacekeeping activities and potential local wars (TAB D), but also as a backdrop to diplomacy in Europe (TAB A) and in East Asia (TAB C).

Forces for Asia: Military forces in Asia are addressed in the context of maintaining a balance of power in East Asia (TAB C), of providing a capability to counter the Soviets in a worldwide war (TAB B), and of providing for peacekeeping activities or intervention in potential local wars (TAB D). If the US pursues a strategy in East Asia requiring a major military presence, the US would then have the ability to intervene in most potential conflicts, including conflict with the Soviets in Asia during a war in Europe. Conversely, if a strategy involving reduced peacetime presence in Asia were to be chosen, the US might still want to acquire deployable military forces for intervention in potential conflicts, including those in Asia.

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(U) Included in the descriptions of the substrategies for each analytical area is a brief discussion of the likely political and military force implications. Unless explicitly indicated otherwise, it has been assumed that the military objectives and programs of both hostile and friendly nations will remain as described in existing intelligence projections. Thus, allied contributions and enemy threats have tended to be constant, not over time but across the spectrum of US strategy alternatives. This is an approximation that needs to be refined in subsequent study.

(U) The final chapter (Tab F) describes current US military strategies and capabilities. The next steps in the PRM 10 study will be:

- To integrate the substrategies into alternative worldwide military strategies (the AIMS).

- To design several appropriate force postures for each AIMS and identify their fiscal implications.

- To assess the adequacy of alternative strategies and forces in terms of the ability of each strategy to secure objectives and of each force to support its corresponding strategy.

- To describe the domestic economic, foreign policy and arms control implications for each alternative strategy, as well as likely allied, Soviet and third country reactions.

#### Key Questions

(S) Prior to the meeting, you may find it useful to focus on the following key questions which govern the development of military strategy and force postures. (Additional questions, are presented at the end of the discussion of each analytical area.)

(1) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US continue the current policy of urging NATO to improve its capabilities for conventional response to conventional attacks, or consider policies which would place greater reliance on nuclear weapons?

(2) NATO-Warsaw Pact: Should the US consider policies under which NATO would take the offensive against Warsaw Pact territory in response to aggression?

(3) NATO-Warsaw Pact: How much divergence should the US be willing to accept between its policies and those of its NATO Allies?

(4) Worldwide War: In a worldwide war with the Soviets, should the US be prepared to engage in operations outside of the European theater, recognizing that current strategy calls for the redeployment of some forces from the Pacific to reinforce NATO?

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(5) East Asia: Should US military strategy for East Asia emphasize a global ability to contain the Soviets or an ability to maintain the current stable balance in the Pacific?

(6) Local Wars: Should the US have military forces available to intervene in a crisis or local war situation, such as in the Middle East, without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes, such as reinforcing Europe?

(7) Homelands Exchange: To what extent should the US procure strategic nuclear forces, above and beyond those required to achieve other US objectives, in order to respond to major US-Soviet force asymmetries. In other words, should we insist on perceived parity?

6 Attachments  
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A. NATO-WARSAW PACT CONFLICT IN EUROPE

NATO has always faced a fundamental dilemma in choosing a military strategy to deter or respond to a Warsaw Pact attack. Conventional defense is expensive and particularly burdensome for countries with serious economic difficulties, and even if successful it would be very destructive. But a nuclear warfighting "defense" would be even more destructive, and few believe it would give NATO a net advantage. Nuclear weapons can contribute to deterrence of a Pact conventional or nuclear attack; but they cannot compensate for inadequacies in conventional forces, and their employment risks Soviet nuclear counterattack against Europe or the US. The current Alliance strategy of "flexible response" confronts the dilemma by deliberate ambiguity which permits improvements in conventional forces, while at the same time maintaining nuclear forces for deterrence.

A US strategy for Europe must also take into account the military capabilities which the Allies will contribute. US adoption of goals significantly more ambitious than those supported by the Allies will be of little avail unless the US is prepared to bear a larger share of the Alliance burden or to undertake to persuade the Allies to adopt similar policies.

In the discussions which follow, alternative substrategies for deterring or responding to a Warsaw Pact attack are defined. They are described as NATO (rather than US) strategies, and the difficulties the US might encounter in persuading NATO to adopt each strategy are discussed. The alternative NATO strategies differ mainly in assumptions about (1) the degree to which NATO relies on nuclear weapons to deter or respond to conventional attacks, (2) the objectives NATO seeks in terminating a conventional conflict, and (3) the military capability NATO would plan to acquire to sustain a conventional defense before the decision would have to be taken to surrender or use nuclear weapons.

Alternative Military Substrategies

1. Tripwire

Under this strategy, which was more or less in force in the 1950's, NATO would rely solely on nuclear forces to deter or respond to any threat or attack on the assumption that fear of a nuclear response is an adequate deterrent to Pact aggression in Europe. If a conventional attack occurred, the NATO objective would be to terminate the conflict by the shock effect of its nuclear response and to convince the Pact to withdraw from NATO territory by the threat of further nuclear attacks.

If this strategy were chosen, the US would maintain only those land, naval or air forces in or near Europe needed to protect and employ theater-based nuclear forces. In planning US nuclear forces, the US would demonstrate willingness to initiate the use of nuclear (tactical

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and strategic) weapons almost immediately in response to a Pact conventional attack. Here, maintaining political sufficiency in US strategic forces and adequate US strategic defensive capability (ASW, civil defense) would be important to maintaining the credibility of our deterrent. Indeed, a large, menacing US strategic force would be needed to show the Soviets that we would not be deterred from executing the tripwire strategy. Regardless of what strategies were chosen in other analytical areas, adoption of this strategy for Europe would lead to a major reduction in US and Allied conventional forces, especially reserve forces. Conversely, theater nuclear weapons' survivability would need to be enhanced.

A tripwire strategy would represent a radical abandonment of the NATO strategy of flexible response. Europeans (like many Americans) believe that deterrence is enhanced by the inescapable threat that any conflict in Europe will escalate to nuclear war. However, especially (though not uniquely) under conditions of strategic parity or worse, they would view the credibility of a strategy based solely on nuclear weapons to be low, and they would face the prospect that any war on European soil would be a nuclear one. The major reduction of US conventional forces in Europe would be viewed as a reduction of the American commitment to Europe.

## 2. Elastic Tripwire

Under this strategy, NATO would rely more heavily than at present on nuclear forces to deter or respond to any threat or attack on NATO, but NATO would maintain a limited conventional defense capability to handle accidents; to deter or defeat limited Warsaw Pact probes; and to provide a "conventional pause" of about one week against a full-scale conventional attack. This pause would buy time for political action prior to a decision to withdraw or use nuclear weapons. This strategy would avoid automatic recourse to nuclear weapons at the outset of a Warsaw Pact attack (and thereby preserve the principle of NATO flexible response doctrine), but it would not seek a real conventional defense against a sustained Pact attack. Theater nuclear forces would be maintained for battlefield and deep strike use against Warsaw Pact military targets prior to being employed against East European and Soviet value targets.

If this strategy were chosen, the US would maintain approximately the current level of combat forces in Europe but would plan no major reinforcement and much less sustaining capability. As with a pure Tripwire strategy, adoption of this strategy for Europe would likely result in a major reduction in US CONUS-based conventional forces and in Allied reserve forces.

This strategy assumes that a concerted, full-scale attack by the Warsaw Pact is extremely unlikely and would be deterred by the threat of a nuclear response. The effect on NATO would be unclear. The number of US troops in Germany would not be diminished. Several members of the



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Alliance today have the capability only to defend effectively for one to two weeks. However, elimination of US plans to reinforce Europe and a reduction in sustaining capability would reverse the policies the US has pursued since the mid-1960's and would certainly be unsettling to the Alliance. As with "Tripwire," some Allies would view this strategy as having little credibility. Other Allies structure their own forces this way but would be upset by a US decision to do the same.

### 3. Limited Loss (Approximately current NATO capability)

Under this strategy, NATO would maintain conventional forces to defend against a Warsaw Pact attack for about 30 days, giving up only small amounts of territory.\* NATO would rely on nuclear forces both to deter or respond to nuclear attacks and to strengthen conventional deterrence by exploiting fears that a conventional defeat would produce a nuclear response. If the conventional Pact attack were not halted, the US would retain the same nuclear options as in the previous strategy.

This strategy represents the capabilities most European NATO Allies are now building toward. The US would maintain at least its current level of forces in Europe with limited but rapid reinforcement capability from CONUS. The sustaining capability of US forces for conflict in Europe would be reduced. Some active and most reserve forces might no longer be required for a war in Europe.

The commitment of substantial US conventional forces would preserve the credibility of the NATO flexible response doctrine. By avoiding automatic or early recourse to nuclear weapons, the strategy would maintain the uncertainty in the mind of the aggressor as to the nature of NATO's response to attack. By maintaining a conventional defense capability, the strategy would deny the Soviets assurance of a quick victory and thus would have an element of credibility that reliance on nuclear weapons can never have. However, if the expectation of loss of territory were explicitly stated, this strategy would be at variance with NATO's present forward defense posture and agreed objective of preserving territorial integrity. Furthermore, it cannot counter the risk that the Soviets have or will acquire the sustaining capability to outlast NATO.

### 4. Direct Defense

Under this strategy, NATO would rely mainly on conventional forces to deter or respond to a Warsaw Pact attack. Should conventional conflict occur, NATO's objective would be to preserve or restore the

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\* A variant of this strategy would be to defend conventionally for 90 days giving up only small amounts of territory. Convoy escort operations for resupply would be necessary under this variant. This variant approximates current US Department of Defense planning guidance. It would require a sizable build-up in Allied sustaining capability.

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pre-war boundaries by a phased conventional campaign. In the event that conventional forces failed to achieve these objectives, NATO would have the option of accepting limited loss of territory, as in the previous strategy, or of escalation to nuclear war.

If this strategy were chosen, additional US and Allied forces and sustaining capability would be required in the Center Region and on the flanks.

A strong conventional defense in Europe would reduce the risk of the US having to initiate nuclear war. However, its conventional emphasis could call to question US determination to confront the Soviets with a grave risk of nuclear use, including escalation to the strategic level, in the event of large-scale aggression. Such a perception could stimulate perennial European concern over the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Finally, it is questionable whether the Allies could be persuaded to provide the forces necessary to implement this strategy.

#### 5. Offsetting Attacks

This strategy differs from the previous one in that, should conventional conflict occur, NATO would seek a quid pro quo for use in negotiating a return to pre-war boundaries. While defending for an extended period with limited territorial loss against the main Pact attack, NATO could counterattack into Pact territory in an area of relative Pact weakness. Initial naval emphasis would be on destruction of the Soviet fleet. In the event conventional forces failed to achieve their objectives, NATO would have the option of accepting limited losses or escalation to nuclear war. As in the case of Direct Defense, major additions to US and Allied forces and sustaining capability would be required. By planning to seize Warsaw Pact territory, this strategy runs a greater risk of Soviet resort to nuclear weapons than previous strategies; consequently, NATO's nuclear deterrent would assume greater importance to deter Soviet first use of nuclear weapons.

By committing NATO in advance to operations in multiple theaters against a Warsaw Pact move in any single theater, this strategy would raise the stakes to the Pact of seeking to isolate and move against the flanks or the Central Region of NATO. The offensive nature of this strategy, the requirement for a major conventional build-up, and the expectation of some initial losses of Allied territory could diminish its acceptability to the European Allies.

#### 6. Major Counter-Offensive Against the Pact

This strategy would be a continuation of the Direct Defense or Offsetting Attack strategies. Its objective would be to achieve post-war stability through neutralization of a part of Eastern Europe and other geographic/political readjustments. While this policy may seem

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rather extreme, it is similar to that of the Warsaw Pact which, if attacked plans to counterattack and drive to the Channel, destroying NATO forces in West Germany and Benelux. The force implications of this strategy include an increase in US and Allied conventional forces and sustaining capability. Both theater and strategic nuclear weapons would play a major role in deterring Soviet first use.

It is doubtful that the Alliance could be persuaded to provide the necessary increases in forces to implement this strategy. A Warsaw Pact response would be a further conventional build-up of its own. The outcome, assuming the Alliance could hold together under the political and economic strain, would be a dramatic increase in the level of military confrontation in Central Europe.

The following table highlights the major variables among the substrategies presented for a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe:

<u>ALTERNATIVE MILITARY STRATEGIES</u>				
<u>Strategy</u>	<u>Need For Nuclear Weapons</u>	<u>Conventional War Termination Objectives</u>	<u>Conventional Sustaining Capability</u>	<u>Role of Allies</u>
Tripwire	Primary	None	0	Current Nuclear Role
Elastic Tripwire	High	Conventional Pause for Negotiation	7 Days	Current Active Forces
Limit Loss	Moderate	Loss of Territory--Not Major	30 Days	Current Forces
Direct Defense	Low	Restore Status Quo Ante by Retaking Territory	90 Days	Increased Forces
Offsetting Attacks	Moderate	Restore Status Quo Ante by Exchange of Territory	Indefinite	Increased Forces
Counteroffensive	High	Seize East European Territory	Indefinite	Increased Forces

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### Questions for Discussion

Some of the questions presented below do not impact directly on a choice among the strategies just described. However, they have an effect on the forces required to implement the strategies.

1. Should the US continue the current policy of urging NATO to improve its capabilities for conventional response to conventional attack, or consider policies which would place greater reliance on nuclear weapons?

There is agreement that NATO's nuclear forces contribute to deterrence of conventional attacks. At issue is whether the threat of escalation to nuclear conflict is and will continue to be an adequate deterrent to conventional conflict. Since the mid-1960's, the US has been moving NATO away from reliance on nuclear forces toward building adequate conventional forces. However, the US still formally supports NATO's strategy of flexible response which contains options for first use, and the Allies put considerable faith in the nuclear deterrent to conventional attack. A related issue is whether this US stance is appropriate if an adequate conventional defense remains the US goal.

2. How much divergence should the US be willing to accept between its policies and those of its NATO Allies?

A common Alliance policy is necessary for rational planning and equitable burden-sharing. At present there are several sources of divergence between US and Allied planning, including different interpretations of the same strategy statements and divergence between the requirements of the strategy and the capabilities actually funded. These disconnects are especially evident in differences between planned sustaining capability (30 days for Allies versus 90 days for the US).

3. Assuming agreement on a policy, how far should the US go in making up for Allied deficiencies?

While the US makes the single largest contribution to the NATO Alliance, it does not contribute the majority of NATO's capability in any category except nuclear forces and naval carrier and amphibious forces. Nor does the US plan to make up for Allied deficiencies in all areas. On the flanks, the burden of territorial defense is borne almost entirely by local forces. While some may object to differentiating among Allies, the US has always done so by putting the weight of its effort on the defense of Central Europe, primarily because that is the focus of the Pact threat.

4. What will be US war termination objectives if conventional conflict breaks out in Europe? Should the US consider policies under which NATO would take the offensive against Warsaw Pact territory in response to aggression?

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Is the US willing to risk permanent loss of some NATO territory? How substantially should the US support NATO's formal objective of preserving or restoring territorial integrity? Should Soviet aggression be punished? Are US objectives the same in all areas (e.g., in Eastern Turkey as in West Germany)?

5. How much time should the US allow in planning for political authorities to decide to mobilize in response to Warsaw Pact mobilization?

The "lag time" between the beginning of Pact mobilization and NATO nations' individual and collective decisions to respond is a major factor in determining requirements for peacetime deployed forces and rates of reinforcement. This time is composed of the time required to collect and evaluate intelligence (less than 48 hours for a major build-up) and that time required to arrive at a political decision to respond. The longer national authorities wish to be able to deliberate, the greater the headstart the Pact gets, and the larger NATO's peacetime deployed forces must be.

6. How long should the US plan to be able to sustain conventional operations?

A decision on US conventional sustaining capability will be affected by NATO's war termination objectives, judgments about how long the Pact can and will continue conventional operations, and the sustaining capability planned by the Allies.

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B. NON-EUROPEAN OPERATIONS DURING A NATO-WARSAW PACT WAR IN EUROPE

This analytical area addresses alternative US worldwide strategies in the event of a war with the Warsaw Pact in Europe. If the Soviets attacked in Europe, it is not known if they would attempt to limit the conflict to Europe or would also attack elsewhere. A choice of strategy must consider the effect that US defensive and offensive operations outside Europe would have on the war in Europe and on US interests worldwide. Particularly, a strategy must address US interests in the Middle East, given the dependency of Western Europe on Middle East oil. Whatever strategy is chosen will have major force and political implications.

Alternative Military Substrategies\*

1. Minimal Effort

This strategy concentrates on the defense of Western Europe on the assumption that by containing or defeating the Warsaw Pact in Europe, the Soviets would be effectively countered and US interests protected. Forces would be provided to protect the United States (including Hawaii and Alaska), to keep open the Caribbean SLOC, and to neutralize Cuba.

No US forces would be provided to intervene in the Middle East, to protect the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, or to counter possible Soviet initiatives in East Asia or elsewhere. The US would not provide forces to oppose Soviet client-state forces, would withdraw to a Hawaii-Guam-Alaska basing line in the Pacific, and would enlist the help of China in keeping the war from extending to North Asia.

Such a strategy would reduce the size and cost of US military forces but the Soviets would have increased flexibility to undertake military initiatives in Asia or to reinforce Europe during a European war. It would also force Japan and other Asian allies to fend for themselves if attacked or pressured in such a situation.

2. Limited Action (Approximately current US capabilities)

This strategy calls for ensuring that military forces, not specifically designated for use in a European war, are available to deter and counter potential Soviet military initiatives outside Europe. The US and its allies would seek to ensure the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf

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\* In the case of each substrategy, US nuclear forces outside Europe would be sized and structured to deter first use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union

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and undertake limited conventional attacks against Soviet air and naval forces, as well as deny the Soviets free use of the seas. \*

While continuing to emphasize the importance of Europe, this strategy recognizes that the US has worldwide interests which are important enough to warrant providing some additional forces. The US would rely on political and economic efforts to improve US-PRC relations as a balance to the Soviets.

### 3. Initiatives

This strategy calls for the US to have significant capability to initiate war against the Soviet Union outside Europe during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. In addition to the capabilities required in the Limited Action Strategy, the US would provide the military capability to destroy the Soviet navy, neutralize Soviet intelligence efforts, attack Soviet naval and air facilities, employ air and naval forces against the Soviet coasts, secure the availability of Persian Gulf oil, and reduce Cuba to a level at which it could not threaten US interests. The US would encourage PRC initiatives against the Soviets and seek support from other nations worldwide to help divert Soviet resources (disproportionate to US efforts) from the Atlantic and European theaters.

The force structure to support this strategy would necessarily be additive.

### Questions for Discussion

#### 1. What should be the US military objectives outside Europe during a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe?

##### a. To concentrate on defeating the Warsaw Pact only in Europe?

-- To try to keep the war limited to Europe and the North Atlantic in the hope that the conflict there can be quickly terminated in the expectation that the extension of the war to other theaters would make the termination of the war in Europe more difficult?

##### -- To avoid initiating hostilities against Soviet forces in Asia?

b. To initiate attacks (perhaps on a progressive basis) against Soviet sea and land targets in other parts of the world in the hope that the extension of the war to other theaters will facilitate our effort to terminate the war in Europe?

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\* Forces will be planned on the assumptions that overseas basing would continue to be available, that US allies would assist in their own defense, and that they would participate in protecting SLOC's.

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2. If the US were unable to achieve a desired war termination objective, would the US use nuclear weapons in Europe or Asia or prosecute the war by taking initiatives against the Soviets elsewhere with either conventional or nuclear forces?

3. Should we continue to plan for the reinforcement of NATO Europe from the Pacific as is the case today?

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C. EAST ASIA

In contrast to the preceding two analytical areas, this section focuses on alternative strategies for the peacetime deployment of US military forces. The military adequacy of each East Asia substrategy will then be tested against its ability to satisfy military requirements during a worldwide war with the Soviets. In the less demanding case of a war limited to East Asia, the demands on US capability could be met from other resources.

The primary US objective in East Asia is to stabilize the current, relatively favorable balance among the great powers--Japan, China, the Soviet Union and the United States. An important adjunct to this objective is supporting US defense commitments to our Asian allies. In the Pacific, the US military forces must also be able to protect US territories and the many approaches to the continental United States across wide expanses.

Changes in US military deployments in East Asia affect the major powers differently. Japan is probably most sensitive to such changes. It currently perceives no immediate danger from either the PRC or the USSR, in part because of confidence in the US security umbrella. If this confidence were to be significantly shaken, the Japanese response would be uncertain, but US ability to influence Japanese armament programs is not very great.

The Soviet Union is less immediately sensitive to changes in US East Asia military deployments. The Soviets face the possibility of a two front war, but with the additional complexity of another threatening great power and a long and vulnerable line of communication to the eastern region of their nation.

The United States could capitalize on this situation by arranging its peacetime military deployments to reduce the Soviet's global strategic flexibility. Ideally, US deployments might force greater Soviet counter-deployments. Soviet strategic problems could be magnified should the United States forge meaningful security links with the PRC. The Chinese are unlikely to want such links which could prove dangerous if they were of sufficient magnitude to stimulate the Soviets to consider pre-emptive attack.

The PRC, at this time, is sensitive to changes in US deployment in East Asia and even more concerned with our deployments in Europe and our overall global military posture vis-a-vis the USSR. Chinese security needs are dominated by their perception of the Soviet threat. Inasmuch as the PRC appears neither to be territorially expansionistic nor likely to constitute a major threat to US interests, as long as the Sino-Soviet hostility persists, the United States does not currently need to size forces against a Chinese threat.

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Two interrelated factors not subjected to analysis because they are the subject of another PRM are (1) structuring and deployment of US forces in East Asia as a complicating factor in any Soviet effort to intimidate or consider war against the PRC, and (2) the role of US military forces in the event of Sino-Soviet hostilities. A possible option under the latter circumstances would be the provision of various forms of US military assistance to the PRC short of actual combat involvement.

What this analytical area does present is alternative US military strategies in East Asia that differentiate among the following criteria: the peacetime locations of deployed US forces, plans for involvement in regional conflicts, and plans for operations against the Soviets should a US-Soviet war break out.

#### 1. Withdrawal

Under this strategy, the US would withdraw militarily from the Asian continent to a Central Pacific basing line (Alaska-Guam-Hawaii) to disengage itself both from active participation in the East Asian balance of power and to avoid involvement in any regional conflicts. The United States would not structure air or naval forces for offensive action in the Western Pacific but would retain the ability to protect US territory and approaches to CONUS. The US would avoid military involvement in any regional hostilities.

This strategy assumes some combination of the following: (1) the regional balance of power between Japan, China and the USSR is driven principally by factors other than US peacetime military presence, (2) given Japan's technological/industrial/economic base, political changes over time will allow Japan the ability to defend itself, (3) the Sino-Soviet competition will continue to force the Soviets and the PRC to focus military resources on each other, (4) a major shift in balance in East Asia would not directly threaten US security, (5) the US has no significant security interest in any potential regional conflict short of one involving Japan itself or short of a Sino-Soviet war, and (6) finally, threats to our commitments, such as to the Philippines, are not likely to occur.

The political consequences of this strategy are uncertain because the assumptions are so uncertain. Significantly reduced US military participation in East Asia might well cause the Chinese to lose interest in the United States as a counter-weight to the Soviets. A loss of confidence in the US security treaty would probably lead to substantial changes in Japan's relations with the major powers, possibly including closer ties with either China or the Soviets, or more likely a greater autonomous Japanese defensive capability. US disengagement could also undermine US non-proliferation efforts, particularly in South Korea and Taiwan and possibly even in Japan. Major US force reductions in this theater could, however, allow diversion of greater US resources to NATO.

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## 2. Modified Withdrawal

Under this strategy, the United States would withdraw to the same Central Pacific basing line (Alaska-Guam-Hawaii) to disengage its military forces from day-to-day active participation in the East Asian balance of power. The United States would, however, make occasional peacetime naval deployments to the Western Pacific to assure China, Japan, and others of continued US interest in East Asian affairs. In contrast with the previous substrategy of total withdrawal, the US would maintain the capability for selective involvement in regional conflicts. Hence, the United States would maintain in the Central Pacific military forces capable of offensive naval and air operations in East Asia, but these operations, without the Philippine, Korean or Okinawan bases, would be significantly more difficult than currently possible. Should the Soviets themselves threaten the regional balance, these forces would also be capable of rapid deployment for similar operations against the USSR.

This strategy would advance US interests in Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China only to the extent that these countries perceived the United States as willing and able to redeploy these forces to East Asia as necessary. Should these countries not perceive their own interests secured, the consequences of this strategy might be similar to those described under the previous one.

## 3. Reduced Western Pacific Presence

This strategy does not involve so complete a withdrawal of forward deployed US forces, but rather involves occupation of a peacetime basing line in the Western Pacific (Alaska-Japan-Okinawa-Guam). It has the United States pull out of Philippine and Korean bases so as to disengage itself from the potential regional conflicts there, yet the United States would still retain substantial forward deployed forces for active participation in the East Asian balance of power.

In this strategy, US forces would not be structured to engage in offensive operations against Soviet territory in the Far East, but they would be capable of defeating Soviet aggression in cooperation with either or both the Chinese and Japanese. The US contribution would be primarily naval and air. Further, US military forces would possess the capability to protect US territories and bases in the Pacific as well as provide political and military reassurance to our Pacific friends and the Soviets' enemies.

The strategy seeks to prevent Soviet redeployment of significant military resources from the Far East to the European theater with the reduced but still substantial US forces deployed to the Western Pacific. The strategy assumes that US peacetime deployments are linked directly with the willingness of the Chinese to continue to pose a military threat to the Soviet Union, thus enhancing the global containment of the Soviets.

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But, these US forces could not engage in offensive operations against Soviet territory. Primary reliance would be on the Chinese to hold down Soviet land forces in the Far East. The limited nature of other US regional interests is acknowledged.

The implementation of this strategy requires great care to avoid damaging US interests; since, in contrast with the previous strategies, this presumes US interests are sensitive to force withdrawals. Complete US withdrawal from Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines would significantly weaken US influence there. A careful package of US incentives to these countries would probably be needed to inhibit their attempts to acquire advanced technology weapons (including nuclear) or Soviet initiatives to forge closer ties.

#### 4. Current Presence in Western Pacific

Under this strategy, the US maintains a strong, forward deployed military stance to facilitate active engagement in East Asian security affairs. The strategy seeks to contain Soviet power on a global scale. Cooperative security arrangements between the United States and Japan, and a de facto one with China in East Asia, compel the Soviets to divert major military resources to the Far East where they confront a powerful array of potential enemies. Further, strong US presence in East Asia promotes Asian confidences in their respective US treaties, thus encouraging regional stability while minimizing incentives for the acquisition of advanced weapons technology. The strategy assumes that a strong US military presence in East Asia is essential to the security links with Japan and the PRC. It is also assumed that active peacetime US military involvement in East Asian security affairs confers a degree of stability and US control of events. In the event of Korean hostilities the United States would participate principally with naval and air power.

US military forces in this strategy will be capable of taking the initiative against the Soviet Navy and LOC's in and to the Far East, defeating any Soviet military initiatives in the region, and assisting the South Koreans in the event of hostilities.

Two potential problems exist with this strategy. First, while the strategy supports many US interests in peacetime, if conflict should break out in Europe, the United States is currently committed to reinforce NATO from Pacific assets. In this eventuality, the military balance in East Asia will be altered over a compressed time frame. These commitments have not been discussed with either Japan or China, and the partial US disengagement would strengthen Japanese incentives to remain neutral during a US-Soviet war.

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5. Increased Presence in the Western Pacific

This strategy seeks global advantage vis-a-vis the Soviets by threatening them with increased US military forces in East Asia. Closer cooperative, possibly explicit, security links with China and powerful, highly mobile US forces are designed to intimidate the Soviet Union in East Asia. The objective is to prevent Soviet action in other theaters, particularly Europe, by compelling them to preposition forces in the Far East during peacetime which are capable of coping with a combination Sino-American threat. It will also help deter the Soviet threat to China. Selection of this strategy is based on the assumption that the US military posture in East Asia has a direct bearing on the intensity of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and the willingness of the Chinese to enter into a cooperative security arrangement with the United States. The United States would seek to avoid involvement in regional hostilities that might absorb US forces, such as Korea, since the United States would want to have the flexibility and the forces to cause a diversion of Soviet--not American--resources to peripheral areas.

US military forces must be capable of engaging in offensive military operations against Soviet territory and installations in the Far East including the ability to seize Soviet held islands.

The consequences of this strategy are uncertain. Additional US forces might not have the desired or even a significant peacetime effect in East Asia where current Soviet influence is not great. The effect, however, on Soviet allocation of military resources might be considerable. The United States may encounter difficulties when attempting to obtain Chinese and Japanese cooperation in building more military power. Should the Soviets see these developments as threatening, there is an attendant risk of possible violent Soviet reaction, particularly if the United States should seek to establish over/formal security links with the PRC.

The following table highlights the major variables among the substrategies presented for East Asia. The subsequent map indicates basing line changes. Questions for discussion follow the map.

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
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SUMMARY OF ALTERNATIVE INTEGRATED MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR EAST ASIA

OPTION	PEACETIME SUPPORT FOR CHINA	US ROLE IN SINO-SOVIET WAR	ENCOURAGE JAPANESE REARMAMENT	US ROLE IN ROK
1. <u>Withdraw.</u>	None	Neutral	Indifferent but limited US role reduces ability to influence scope or pace of Japanese rearmament	None; let Japan/China decide Korean status
2. <u>Withdraw.</u> Retain the capability to rapidly redeploy.	Selected military/technical/ intelligence support	Favor China but no military role	Favor limited Japanese rearmament but caveated as above 1/	None; let Japan/China decide Korean status
3. <u>Maintain</u> reduced WestPac presence	Favor China but limit initiatives to technical support	Consider FMS/technical/ intelligence assistance	Yes, defensively oriented 2/	Constrained FMS/ Log Support
4. <u>Maintain</u> current Western Pacific presence	Limited	Favor China; possible clandestine log/FMS/ technical/intelligence support	Yes, defensively oriented	Constrained support
5. <u>Increased</u> presence	Selected military/technical/ intelligence support	Assist China; consider air and naval support	No	Logistic support only

1/ The range of rearmament options available to Japan is wide and might even include acquisition of nuclear weapons associated delivery systems.  
 2/ The range of defensive armaments would include improved air defense capabilities and expanded ASW and SLOC defense forces.

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Questions for Discussion

1. Should US military strategies for East Asia emphasize a global ability to contain the Soviets or an ability to maintain the current stable balance in the Pacific.
2. Should strategies be selected to counter Soviet power and influence in Asia? To hold down Soviet forces in this region if the United States is engaged in the defense of Western Europe? How much should the United States rely on the PRC and Japan to hold down Soviet forces and what help should the United States give them?
3. Should the United States alter current plans to move Pacific assets to the Atlantic in a war with the Soviets? Should the United States discuss these plans with the Japanese?
4. What sort of security relationship should the United States develop with the PRC? (PRM-24 is considering this issue)
  - a. Should the US limit its objective to a strong politically stable China and the equilibrium of power desired to maintain a peaceful environment; or should we go beyond to achieve deterrence of Soviet initiatives in Asia, or to measures to counter a Soviet threat worldwide?
  - b. Should the United States confine support of the PRC to political understandings, limited technical and advisory assistance; or should support involve substantial technical, logistical and FMS trans-actions?
5. How should the US interest in avoidance of Sino-Soviet hostilities be reflected in US military strategy and posture?
6. Should certain contingencies be eliminated from US planning (e.g., the defense of Taiwan or Korea)? Should the United States minimize the likelihood of US participation in any Asian contingencies involving US treaty obligations? What are the political consequences and the effects on deterrence?

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D. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES AND POTENTIAL LOCAL WARS

It is likely that during the next decade conflicts will erupt outside Europe or the Far East that warrant the use of US military power. Potential US actions range from crisis management or peacekeeping activities--where military force provides a backup for diplomacy--to military intervention. Such actions could involve a direct confrontation with Soviet forces (or their proxies), especially given the growing capability of the Soviets to project military power beyond their borders.

Not only do US interests vary over time and from region to region, but the risks and difficulties of action are also sensitive to specific conditions. For instance, important interests might be at stake in a war in the Middle East involving the Soviets, whereas lesser interests might be at risk in a conflict in South Asia not involving the Soviets or their proxies. Such differences have a major impact on US force deployments and potentially on the military capabilities the US might want to acquire.

Alternative Military Substrategies

The key to differentiating the alternative substrategies is not how the US should plan to use military force but rather how much and what types of military force should be available as needed, without drawing down on the capabilities acquired to meet other substrategies.\*

1. Proxy Reliance

This strategy assumes that US interests in potential conflicts or crises outside Europe or East Asia would be protected by actions short of US military involvement. The US would plan only limited shows of force. The US would rely heavily on proxies--with US security assistance--and/or diplomacy to advance US interests. Under this strategy, the US would use only indirect means of preventing Soviet involvement in local situations, such as by increasing pressures in Europe or East Asia. With a perceived military pullback from the current US posture, such a strategy might encourage regional arms races and nuclear proliferation.

2. Limited Action

This strategy assumes that there are regions where US interests are important enough to justify limited military action during a crisis or war. The US would plan for logistical support and limited naval and tactical air forces, but not for the commitment of US land combat

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\* Nuclear weapons, though they could conceivably be used in a local conflict, serve primarily in a background role. Organic theater nuclear weapons would deploy with assigned forces as required.

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forces. Direct Soviet involvement would be riskier since some form of US-Soviet engagement might be likely; but a determined Soviet military role could not be resisted militarily without draw down elsewhere.

3. Light Intervention (Approximately current US capabilities--without drawing on forces reinforcing NATO Europe)

This strategy assumes that there are areas of the world where US interests would be significant enough for the US to provide logistical support and to commit moderate naval and tactical air but only limited land combat forces. It recognizes that US global interests are not wholly congruent with those of our allies, and thus the US needs a capability for some unilateral military action. Such a capability could unilaterally counter Soviet proxy involvement, but could combat actual Soviet ground forces only in areas relatively far from the USSR, such as in Southern Africa. Thus, confrontation with the USSR might be risked, but only if and where we can be confident of local military advantage.

4. Heavy Intervention

This strategy assumes that the US has interests outside Europe or the Far East that are sufficiently vital to warrant risking general war in order to protect them. Although the US would prefer to act in concert with its allies, it is prepared to act unilaterally to secure US objectives. This strategy would allow the commitment of considerable land, naval, and air power. Forces would be employed according to military need and would not be constrained for the sake of avoiding confrontation. Thus, all types of forces (land, naval, and air) might conceivably be used in the Middle East; conversely emphasis might be only on naval and air forces in a contingency farther from the USSR (e.g., quarantine of Cuba).

Questions for Discussion

To identify the level of US interest in localized crises and conflicts and to set an upper limit on the US military forces for peacetime functions, guidance is needed (now or later) on the following questions:

1. Should the US have military forces available to intervene in a crisis or local war situation without drawing down on forces dedicated to other purposes, such as reinforcing Europe?

a. Arab-Israeli: Should the US be prepared only to provide logistics support, or should the US be prepared to commit US naval, air, and land combat forces to assure Israel's survival? How would this choice depend on the nature of Soviet military involvement?

b. Persian Gulf: Is Mid-East oil an interest for which the US should be prepared to risk general war alone against the USSR--now or later?

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c. Latin America: Should the US be prepared to intervene militarily in any conflict in Latin America either in a peacekeeping role or to counter Soviet involvement by proxy?

d. Africa: Are there any US interests in Africa which could in a crisis situation warrant the involvement of US combat forces?

2. How many conflicts should the US be prepared simultaneously to become involved in militarily, either logistically or tactically?

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E. US-USSR HOMELANDS NUCLEAR CONFLICT

This analytical area focuses on a potential conflict between the US and the Soviet Union involving strategic nuclear attacks on their homelands. US nuclear forces promote four specific objectives:

1. Deterrence of a major Soviet attack on US population, economic, political and military targets.
2. Deterrence of limited Soviet attacks on the US, including counterforce attacks against US strategic nuclear forces.
3. If deterrence fails, the control of escalation and the reduction of damage in the US to the degree practicable.
4. Prevention of Soviet coercion or intimidation of the US during a crisis.

In pursuing these objectives, the US nuclear force posture should also seek to promote nuclear stability by reducing incentives to use nuclear weapons and by limiting potential pressures for arms competition.

Considerable disagreement exists as to what strategy and forces are required to satisfy these objectives. Choices turn on a number of factors, including judgments about the Soviet leadership's future intentions, the uncertainties which surround actual nuclear conflict, and the need to hedge against unforeseen threats.

Detering Major Soviet Attack

The principal objective of US strategic nuclear forces is deterrence of major Soviet attacks against US population, economic, political and military targets. The US strategy is to maintain forces which could sustain a major Soviet attack and survive with sufficient retaliatory capability to inflict that which would be viewed as unacceptable damage by the Soviet Union.

At issue is what level of damage against what kinds of targets would be perceived as "unacceptable." There are no agreed answers. In the mid-1960's, McNamara established as a criterion of unacceptable damage: 25% of the Soviet population and 50% of the Soviet industrial base. Current national policy for employing available US nuclear forces calls for destruction of those political (leadership), economic, and selected military resources critical to the enemy's post-war power. While not specifically targetting Soviet population (which overlaps strongly but is not identical with the political/economic target system), this employment policy does not define the precise level of damage required against which kinds of specific targets.

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To deter a major Soviet attack, substrategies have been defined providing options with the capability to inflict varying percentages of damage against Soviet economic, political, and military resources critical to post-war recovery.\*

The damage criteria described in the substrategies focus on establishing "unacceptable damage" to the Soviet Union independent of the damage the Soviets could do to the US. An alternative would be to include as a damage criterion: that damage to the US in a homeland nuclear conflict will not be significantly greater than that to the Soviet Union. This can be done, for example, by the US selecting, for a given US offensive capability, a US defensive capability which would insure that the relative damage to the US and USSR would be roughly comparable.

Once the US establishes the level of unacceptable damage required for deterrence, an additional issue is what degree of diversity, redundancy, survivability, and strategic reserve the US should build into its strategic forces. Redundancy in forces provides a hedge against a significantly greater-than-expected threat or unanticipated technical shortcomings, such as lower-than-expected missile reliability. Force diversity reduces the possibility that an enemy technological breakthrough will threaten the deterrent. Current policy is to maintain a Triad of strategic forces: ICBM's, SLBM's, and manned bombers. This Triad provides mutually reinforcing and partially overlapping capabilities which give high confidence that the US can maintain an effective retaliatory capability, notwithstanding unforeseen technological breakthroughs or catastrophic failures. In addition, the current force poses major targetting difficulties to the Soviet planner contemplating a first strike, since simultaneous launch of Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's could permit the US to launch ICBM's after verification of SLBM nuclear detonations and before ICBM arrival.

The major alternative would be a Dyad in which the required retaliatory capability resided in two relatively equal strategic forces. With the projected vulnerability of the US fixed silo ICBM force, the US must decide whether to modernize the land-based missile force with a mobile ICBM or go to a launch-under-attack doctrine, or to rely to a greater degree on SLBM's and bombers (recognizing that the Soviets will confront the same choice if our missile accuracy continues to improve).

#### Detering Limited Nuclear Attack

A second US strategic objective is to deter Soviet limited nuclear attacks and to control escalation if nuclear conflict occurs. Current US policy seeks to achieve this objective by having the capability to execute a wide range of less-than-all-out nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union as part of an overall military, political, and diplomatic strategy.

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\* Variations on the substrategies express the criteria for destruction in terms of the percent of damage against industrial targets or population.

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Any US strategic force could execute a limited nuclear attack. What is required is preplanning plus adequate command and control. At issue is whether the US should acquire additional strategic forces to provide: (1) a capability to retaliate with a small number of weapons dedicated to the flexible employment mission, (2) a capability to retaliate against critical Soviet military targets (except missile silos), and (3) an efficient hard target kill capability against all Soviet ICBM silos.

#### Reducing Damage to the US if Deterrence Fails

A third US objective in the event deterrence fails, is to control escalation and to reduce damage in the US to the degree practicable. Since the signing of the ABM treaty, the US has undertaken few programs to defend against missiles or bombers or to reduce the vulnerability of US population and industry to nuclear attack via civil defense, anti-submarine operations, or a strategic counterforce capability.

At issue is what level of defensive capability the US should acquire in the future. Alternative substrategies have been defined providing (1) nominal defensive capabilities such as attack warning and a low level of civil defense, (2) capabilities to provide some air defense and civil defense while matching Soviet defensive R&D efforts, and (3) capabilities for major defensive damage limitation to the US.

A decision on what defensive capabilities the US should acquire in the future needs to appreciate the extreme difficulty involved in reducing damage in the US during a nuclear conflict; the possibility that a defensive capability might appear to the Soviets as threatening their assured destruction capability; and the feasibility of getting public and Congressional support for the programs which would be required to significantly limit damage to the US, i.e., modification of the ABM Treaty, CONUS air defense, and extensive civil defense for population and industry.

#### Inhibiting Coercion

A fourth US objective is to prevent Soviet coercion of the US during a crisis or war. At issue is whether this objective requires additional US strategic forces to insure that the overall strategic balance is perceived by ourselves and the Soviets (as well as US allies) as roughly equal. Should the US respond in kind to potential imbalances in Soviet and US strategic forces or by offsetting major asymmetries (e.g., deploying new cruise missile technologies) to place the Soviet Union in the responsive position?

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In this study, the indices used to gauge the overall Soviet-American balance include quantitative indicators (total delivery vehicles, total MIRVed delivery vehicles, total reentry vehicles and bomber weapons, total missile throwweight and bomber payload) and qualitative indicators (hard target kill capability, equivalent megatonnage, survivable reentry vehicles and bomber weapons, survivable missile throwweight and bomber payload, and the quality of technology).

Substrategies to satisfy this objective, known as "political sufficiency," have been defined (depending on one's view of what is "politically sufficient") providing (1) no additional capabilities to offset major asymmetries in politically sensitive indicators, (2) capability to counter or offset asymmetries in some, but not all, categories, and (3) capability to respond by matching or exceeding Soviet capabilities in all categories.

#### Alternative Substrategies

Four representative homeland substrategies have been identified on the basis of differences with respect to:

1. The kind and level of retaliatory destruction to Soviet recovery resources.
2. The type and degree of US flexible response capability.
3. The extent to which US damage-limiting forces activities should be pursued.
4. How the US should deal with major force asymmetries that could affect political perceptions.

Substrategy 1: This substrategy provides an assured retaliation capability, but poses no additional requirement for dealing with US-Soviet force asymmetries. The ability of such an approach to respond flexibly to limited attacks is extremely limited, and little countermilitary capability or damage-limiting capabilities are provided. This substrategy assumes that domestic and world perceptions would not be unacceptably affected by large disparities in US-Soviet force postures, even if no SALT agreement were reached which could constrain Soviet force modernization and growth to the US force levels associated with this posture.

Substrategy 2: This substrategy couples an assured retaliation capability with a concern for maintaining the overall US-Soviet strategic balance and some countermilitary capability. The most distinctive feature of this substrategy, which lies roughly at the low to middle side of current US policy, is its decision not to pursue a highly effective hard-target-kill capability against all Soviet time-urgent targets, particularly silos, despite Soviet modernization efforts enabling them to attack comparable US targets. Defensive capabilities are maintained at about current levels, with perhaps some modest increase. A major question raised by this strategy is whether deterrence of Soviet attack on the US (or inhibition of Soviet attempts at coercion) would be achieved without the capability to match in kind (as opposed to offsetting) the Soviet hard-target-kill capability.

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